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THE PRIMARY DUTY RULE IN ADMIRALTY
Comparative negligence as a partial defense to a personal injury
action is rapidly displacing the old judge-made complete defense of
contributory negligence.1 In April 1974, Professor Victor Schwartz
counted twenty-six states which have adopted comparative negligence
schemes,' and in March 1975, California joined the growing majority of
American jurisdictions in the comparative negligence camp.3
While the changeover to comparative negligence has accelerated
only recently,4 admiralty practitioners have been working with the con-
cept for over a century. As far back as 1855,1 the Supreme Court of
the United States declared that when two vessels collide and both are at
fault, the owners of each vessel ought to share equally in the damages of
the other. Comparative negligence was introduced into maritime per-
sonal injury law in 1890 in the celebrated case of The Max Morris,6 in
which the Court said that comparative negligence would promote "more
equal distribution of justice, the dictates of humanity, the safety of life
and limb, and the public good."7  Since then, admiralty practitioners
have been scrupulously protective of their comparative negligence tradi-
tion. For example, Justice Hugo Black remarked:
The harsh rule of the common law under which contributory negli-
gence wholly barred an injured person from recovery is completely
incompatible with modern admiralty policy and practice. Exercis-
ing its traditional discretion, admiralty has developed and now fol-
lows its own fairer and more flexible rule which allows such consid-
eration of contributory negligence in mitigation of damages as jus-
tice requires. Petitioner presents no persuasive arguments that ad-
miralty should now adopt a discredited doctrine which automati-
cally destroys all claims of injured persons who have contributed to
their injuries in any degree, however slight. 8
To practitioners of maritime law who are proud of their compara-
tive negligence heritage, two recent decisions may prove disconcerting.
1. The doctrine of contributory negligence can be traced to Butterfield v. For-
rester, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B. 1809).
2. V. ScHWARTZ, COMPARATIvE NEGLIGENCE 3 (1974).
3. See Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858
(1975).
4. See V. ScHwARTz, COMPARATVE NEGLIGENCE 1-3 (1974).
5. See The Schooner Catharine v. Dickinson, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 170 (1855).
6. 137 U.S. 1 (1890).
7. Id. at 14.
8. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 408-09 (1953).
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Reinhart v. United States'
Robert Reinhart was chief mate aboard the SS Queen's Victory,
which transported munitions to Vietnam. Because the ammunition was
exceedingly dangerous, longshoremen in the United States installed
wooden sheathing in the hold of the vessel to prevent contact between
the bombs and the vessel's metal hull. Reinhart, as chief mate, had the
duty to oversee working conditions on the vessel; accordingly, he had
inspected the sheathing and accepted it as suitable for the intended
cargo.
During unloading at Cam Ranh Bay by military crews using
mechanical equipment, portions of the wooden sheathing were smashed.
This occurrence was not unusual. Rough treatment was expected, and
the sheathing was customarily repaired and inspected by longshoremen
in the United States. The vessel itself, however, did not carry the
lumber to repair the sheathing, and her carpenters had no duties regard-
ing sheathing repair while at sea.
Immediately upon discharge of the vessel's cargo in Vietnam,
Reinhart went down into the -hold to supervise its cleaning. He knew
the sheathing had been badly battered. Nevertheless, he had the duty to
set rat traps which government regulations required to be placed in the
holds. Five times Reinhart ventured into the dimly lit hold in pursu-
ance of his duty. On his sixth descent, he took out his flashlight and
began to scan along the sides of the hull. He did not use the light to
illuminate his path. If he had done so, perhaps he could have avoided
the hole in the sheathing through which he fell, sustaining a hernia.
Reinhart brought suit against the United States under the Jones
Act10 and the general maritime law doctrine of unseaworthiness.11 Had
9. 457 F.2d 151 (9th Cir. 1972).
10. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970). Suits under the Jones Act against the federal gov-
ernment as owner of a merchant vessel are authorized by the Suits in Admiralty Act,
46 U.S.C. § 742 (1970), and the Public Vessels Act, 46 U.S.C. § 781 (1970).
11. The shipowner's warranty of seaworthiness under the general maritime law is
a doctrine in the nature of strict liability. Because of the special hazards involved in
going to sea, a seaman has the right to expect that the hull, gear, appliances, ways, ap-
purtenances and manning will be reasonably fit for their intended purposes. 2 M. NOR-
RIS, THE LAW OF MARITIME PERSONAL INJURIES 1 (3d ed. 1975). In Sanford & Brooks
Co. v. Columbia Dredging Co., 177 F. 878, 883 (4th Cir. 1910), for example, the court
explained that "there is an obligation upon the owner of every vessel, implied by law,
that his vessel is tight, staunch and fit for the purposes for which he holds it forth."
Unseaworthiness differs from negligence in that it requires no finding of fault im-
putable to the owner. In this respect it resembles products liability law. Nearly all
types of negligence, however, are likely to render a vessel unseaworthy. For a discussion
of the few remaining differences in coverage between unseaworthiness and Jones Act
negligence see G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 383-404 (2d ed. 1975)
[hereinafter cited as GILMORE & BLACK]. See note 111 infra.
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the court invoked the doctrine of comparative negligence, no doubt he
would have been awarded part of the damages which he claimed.
12
The district court judge ruled, however, that Reinhart had had a
contractual duty to maintain the safety of the vessel and that his breach
of this duty barred recovery. 3 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit affirmed.
Peymann v. Perini Corp. 4
The tug Gorham Whitney had docked for substantial engine over-
haul, and Hans Peymann, chief engineer, was responsible for the repair
job, which included lifting the weighty cylinder heads off the engine
block. The lifting was accomplished by securing a chain fall to the
deck overhead, attaching a chain to the cylinder, and pulling the heads
off. Peymann picked up the forty pound chain fall and attempted to
climb to a railing from which to hook the device to the deck overhead.
Oil from the cylinder head, however, had dripped onto the railing,
which had become slippery. He lost his footing and fell, sustaining a
back injury.
Peymann sued his employer, Perini Corporation, which owned the
Gorham Whitney, under the Jones Act and the doctrine of unseaworthi-
ness. Again, had the doctrine of comparative negligence been applied
to the case, the plaintiff would doubtless have received at least a partial
recovery, in spite of a possible finding that he had failed to perform his
job with enough care for his own safety.' 5
If a seaman's injury is caused by his own negligence in conjunction with the defend-
ant shipowner's breach of the warranty of seaworthiness, the seaman's recovery is re-
duced according to the usual procedure associated with comparative negligence. 2 M.
NoRIS, THE LAW OF MARITIME PERSONAL INJURiES 44-45 (3d ed. 1975).
12. The trial court found that Reinhart's negligence was 75% responsible for his
injuries. The defendant was found not to have been negligent, but was 25% responsible
under the doctrine of unseaworthiness. The trial court, however, relied on the primary
duty rule to bar the plaintiff's recovery altogether. The plaintiff elected to appeal on
the unseaworthiness count only. See 457 F.2d 151, 152-53 (9th Cir. 1972).
13. The court noted that Reinhart had been awarded maintenance and cure. See
id. at 152. This uniquely maritime benefit adheres to seamen only. The scope of cover-
age is extremely broad. Generally, a seaman has a right to maintenance and cure for
any sickness or injury incurred while in the service of the ship. Recovery is limited
to reasonable expenses incurred and only those future expenses that are definitely ascer-
tainable. See generally GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 11, at 281-323.
It should be kept in mind that although the primary duty rule may bar recovery
in a Jones Act or unseaworthiness action, it does not keep a seaman from recovering
maintenance and cure; therefore, a seaman is virtually guaranteed some compensation
for his injuries.
14. 507 F.2d 1318 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 914 (1975).
15. Peymann testified that no ladder had been available and that his employer cus-
tomarily assigned three seamen to the task which he had been expected to do by himself.
March 19761
Nevertheless, the court directed a verdict against Peymann on his
Jones Act count, and the jury returned an adverse verdict on his
unseaworthiness claim. The jury found that Peymann -had had a duty
to his employer to wipe the oil off the railing before climbing up to
begin his repairs.'
In each of these cases, an exception to the doctrine of comparative
negligence was applied to prevent the plaintiff from recovering on his
claim. This exception is known as the primary duty rule.
The primary duty rule is an anomalous concept within maritime
tort law. Briefl stated, the rule embraces the notion that if there is
some negligence on the part of the plaintiff and if it can be characterized
as a breach of his employment duty, the plaintiff can recover nothing in
negligence and unseaworthiness actions against the defendant employ-
er.17 It is an absolute defense, in conflict with the partial defense of
comparative negligence. For that reason, and because of its questiona-
ble historical origins, it has generated considerable controversy among
the several circuit courts of appeals. For a complete understanding of
this controversy and of the thesis of this note that the primary duty rule
has no place in admiralty personal injury law, an historical analysis of
the rule's origins and development is required.
1916 to 1939: FELA Origins of the Primary Duty Rule
Attorneys unfamiliar with the vagaries of admiralty law might be
surprised to learn that the maritime primary duty rule had its origins in
cases under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA),18 which
governs suits by railroad employees against their negligent employers.
The reason for this strange connection between the law of railroads in
interstate commerce and the law of navigable waters can be traced to the
Jones Act,"9 which gives to seamen the right to sue their employers for
negligence without the disability of the fellow servant rule. For reasons
still clouded in mystery,2" the Jones Act provides that in any action
brought under the act, federal laws "modifying or extending the com-
mon-law right or remedy in cases of personal injury to railway employ-
The court of appeals concluded that the jury had rejected these assertions. See id. at
1321. Nevertheless, it was assumed throughout the Peymann decision that the cylinder
heads, dripping oil, had caused the tug to be unseaworthy.
16. Id.
17. See text accompanying notes 140-48 infra.
18. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1970).
19. Act of June 5, 1920, ch. 250, § 33, 41 Stat. 1007 (codified at 46 U.S.C. §
688 (1970)).
20. Gilmore and Black attribute this "odd expedient" of incorporating the FELA
by reference to a desire to avoid "wast[ing] any time on thinking about the special
problems of maritime workers." GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 11, at 351.
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ees shall apply .... "21 Thus, courts routinely cite FELA cases in
Jones Act cases and Jones Act cases in FELA cases,2 2 leaving for case-
by-case resolution the problems which arise out of the inherent differ-
ences between travel by rail and travel by sea.
The primary duty rule in FELA cases originated from what Dean
Prosser calls "a rather unaccountable series of decisions of the Supreme
Court beginning in 191 6.1'23 Its first appearance was inauspicious. In
Great Northern Railwayv. Wiles,24 the plaintiff's decedent, a flagman,
was killed in a train collision. His train had suddenly become uncou-
pled and thus had to be stopped for repairs. As part of his employ-
ment, Wiles had the duty to drop back on such occasions and flag down
oncoming trains. It appeared from the testimony that Wiles knew
another train was due. The state trial court directed a verdict for the
railroad, but the Supreme Court of Washington reversed, ruling that the
case should have gone to the jury under the res ipsa loquitur doctrine,
with the appropriate deduction made for the decedent's share of the
fault.25
The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that even if the
defendant railroad had been negligent, the plaintiff was still barred from
recovery because the decedent had had a duty to others as well as to
himself to flag down the oncoming train.26 The Court continued:
To excuse its neglect in any way would cast immeasurable liability
upon the railroads, and, what is of greater concern, remove secur-
ity from the lives of those who travel upon them; and therefore all
who are concerned with their operation, however high or low in
function, should have a full and an anxious sense of responsibil-
ity.27
Initially cited incorrectly to stand for the simple notion that when
the plaintiff's negligence is the sole cause of the accident, and when the
defendant railroad is not otherwise at fault, the defendant is not liable,28
21. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970).
22. See text accompanying note 63 infra.
23. W. PRossEn, THE LAW OF TORTS 535 (4th ed. 1971).
24. 240 U.S. 444 (1916).
25. See id. at 447.
26. Id. at 448.
27. Id.
28. See, e.g., Union Pac. R.R. v. Hadley, 246 U.S. 330, 333 (1918); Gillis v. New
York, N.H. & H.R.R., 249 U.S. 515, 516 (1919); Frese v. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R., 263
U.S. 1, 3 (1923); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Davis, 279 U.S. 34, 39 (1929).
In 1932, the Missouri Supreme Court reviewed the Wiles case and all the principal
primary duty rule decisions. The court concluded that the primary duty rule did not
really exist, and that all of these cases stood for the proposition that unless the defendant
was negligent, the plaintiff's negligence, if any, would be the sole cause of his injuries.
Brock v. Mobile & O.R.R., 330 Mo. 918, 934-38, 51 S.W.2d 100, 106-08 (1932); accord,
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the rule of the Wiles case was developed and shaped by subsequent
decisions into the proposition that "if the injured employee has contrib-
uted to his injury by the breach of a rule or an instruction ad hoc, he
cannot recover."2 9 This notion was amplified in a line of cases in which
no company rule or instruction had been violated but in which the
plaintiff was held to have had a general duty to repair or maintain, the
breach of which -had caused the injury.30 If the breach of such an
employment duty could be attributed to the plaintiff employee, the
negligent defendant employer had a complete defense. Predictably, the
results produced by the application of the primary duty rule were often
harsh."'
Soon after the primary duty rule -had secured its place in American
jurisprudence, lower courts nationwide struggled to articulate plausible
rationales by which to justify its existence, but they came to no certain
conclusions. It did become clear, however, that the primary duty rule
could not, appearances to the contrary, be placed within the confines of
the doctrine of contributory negligence, since contributory negligence
was a partial defense rather than a complete bar to an FELA action.32
Neither could it be said to be a form of assumption of risk. Until the
FELA was amended in 1939,13 assumption of risk was in most situa-
tions a complete defense,34 but even before 1939, the doctrine was no
defense at all when a defendant railroad was guilty of violating "any
statute enacted for the safety of employees."3 5 In contrast, the primary
duty rule had been applied despite a defendant railroad's violation of
such statutes.36
Perry v. Missouri-Kan.-Tex. R.R., 340 Mo. 1052, 1065, 104 S.W.2d 332, 338-39 (1937);
Hocking Valley Ry. v. Kontner, 114 Ohio St. 157, 150 N.E. 739 (1926).
29. Van Derveer v. Delaware, L. & W.R.R., 84 F.2d 979, 982 (2d Cir. 1936).
30. See, e.g., United States Steel Prods. Co. v. Noble, 10 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1925).
Noble was the first maritime case to which the primary duty rule was applied. In that
case, the vessel's engineer had the general duty to repair a glass water gauge. He neg-
ligently handled the repair, and the glass burst, putting out his eye. The violation of
his duty to repair was held a complete bar to recovery.
31. See, e.g., Unadilla Valley Ry. v. Caldine, 278 U.S. 139 (1928); Frese v. Chi-
cago, B. & Q.R.R., 263 U.S. 1 (1923); Paster v. Pennsylvania R.R., 43 F.2d 908 (2d
Cir. 1930); Blunt v. Pennsylvania R.R., 9 F.2d 395 (6th Cir. 1925); Patterson v. Direc-
tor General, 115 S.C. 390, 105 S.E. 746 (1921).
32. See 45 U.S.C. § 53 (1970).
33. See Act of August 11, 1939, cb. 685, §§ 1, 4, 53 Stat. 1404 (codified at 45
U.S.C. §§ 51, 54 (1970)).
34. See, e.g., Toledo, St. L. & W.R.R. v. Allen, 276 U.S. 165 (1928).
35. Act of April 22, 1908, ch. 149, § 4, 35 Stat. 65 (now 45 U.S.C. § 54 (1970)).
If the plaintiff can show his injury was caused by the defendant's violation of a safety
statute, he need not show that the defendant was negligent; rather, the defendant is liable
regardless of fault. See, e.g., Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426, 430-
31 (1958); San Antonio Ry. v. Wagner, 241 U.S. 476, 484 (1916).
36. See Patterson v. Director General, 115 S.C. 390, 399, 105 S.E. 746, 749
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In McCalmont v. Pennsylvania Co.,3  the district court announced
a new theory which quickly won wide credence. The court in McCal-
mont considered the circumstances in Wiles and assumed that the
defendant railroad in Wiles had violated the Safety Appliance Act,38
since the case involved a defective coupling between cars. There is
language in Wiles which seems to describe the alleged negligence of the
defendant railroad as a passive condition which had been acted upon by
Wiles's violation of his duty.39 Therefore, the court in McCalmont
reasoned,4" the Supreme 'Court must have meant that Wiles's violation
of his employment duty had been the proximate cause of his injury,
rendering any negligence of the defendant a remote cause. 4'
This resourceful piece of interpretation, however, does not square
with the Supreme Court's earlier decision in Union Pacific Railroad v.
Hadley,42 a case nearly identical to Wiles. In Hadley, a train had
decoupled and a flagman had violated company rules by not dropping
back to warn an oncoming train. The flagman was killed in the
ensuing collision, but his widow was not barred from recovery. Justice
Holmes, through an apparently inaccurate reading of Wiles, distin-
guished that case as involving a defendant railroad to which no negli-
gence could be imputed.43 In upholding the plaintiff's recovery in
Hadley, Justice Holmes specifically rejected the very proximate cause
theory that the court in McCalmont was to posit three years later. Justice
Holmes reasoned:
But it is said that in any view of the defendant's conduct, the only
proximate cause of [plaintiff's decedent] Cradit's death was his
own neglect of duty. But if the railroad company was negligent,
it was negligent at the very moment of its final act. It ran one
train into another when if it had done its duty neither train would
have been at that place. Its conduct was as near to the result as
that of Cradit. We do not mean that the negligence of Cradit was
not contributory. We must look at the situation as a practical unit
rather than inquire into a purely logical priority. But even if
Cradit's negligence should be deemed the logical last, it would be
(1921); cf. McCalmont v. Pennsylvania Co., 273 F. 231, 235 (N.D. Ohio 1921), af 'd,
283 F. 736 (6th Cir. 1922). But see Chicago Great W.R.R. v. Schendel, 267 U.S. 287
(1925).
37. 273 F. 231 (N.D. Ohio 1921), aif'd, 283 F. 736 (6th Cir. 1922).
38. See 45 U.S.C. §§ 2, 14 (1970).
39. See 240 U.S. at 448. The Court said, 'There is no justification for a compar-
ison of negligence or the apportioning of their effect. The pulling out of the drawbar
produced a condition which demanded an instant performance of duty by Wiles."
40. See 273 F. at 234-35.
41. The proximate cause theory was also expounded in Cooley v. New York Cent.
R.R., 80 F.2d 816, 817-18 (2d Cir. 1936); Pere Marquette Ry. v. Haskins, 62 F.2d 806,
808 (6th Cir. 1933).
42. 246 U.S. 330 (1918).
43. See 240 U.S. at 448.
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emptying the statute of its meaning to say that his death did not
result in part from the negligence of any employees of the road.44
The Hadley case would appear to have overruled Wiles. Nevertheless,
the Supreme Court in later cases affirmed the primary duty rule without
even mentioning Hadley.45 These subsequent cases failed to describe a
theory under which the rule could be distinguished from contributory
negligence, a defense explicitly held by the FELA not to bar the
plaintiffs recovery.46 The primary duty rule in FELA cases seemed to
be a doctrine without a hypothesis,47 suddenly appearing and winning
acceptance without any explanation.48
44. 246 U.S. at 333. The United States Supreme Court also refuted the proximate
cause theory three years before the appearance of the primary duty rule. In Grand
Trunk Ry. v. Lindsay, 233 U.S. 42 (1914), the defendant argued that the plaintiff's ac-
tive negligence superseded defendant's passive negligence. The theory was rejected. Id.
at 47. If the reasoning in McCalmont was based on a true causation theory, as it pur-
ported to be, then the plaintiff's negligence in violating a duty should have superseded
the defendant's negligence no more than did Lindsay's neglience. For a decision which
adopted this view see Hocking Valley Ry. v. Kontner, 114 Ohio St. 157, 150 N.E. 739
(1926).
45. See, e.g., Unadilla Valley Ry. v. Caldine, 278 U.S. 139 (1928); Davis v. Ken-
nedy, 266 U.S. 147 (1924); Frese v. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R., 263 U.S. 1 (1923).
46. See 45 U.S.C. § 53 (1970).
47. In 1936, Judge Learned Hand very tentatively offered the theory that there
is a distinction to be drawn between "contributory negligence" and "indiscipline." He
then withdrew the remark, however, noting that "it is not . . . our province to do more
than ascertain the extent of the doctrine." Van Derveer v. Delaware L. & W.R.R., 84
F.2d 979, 982 t2d Cir. 1936). The Supreme Court described the primary duty rule as
one in which "contributory negligence . . . became assumption of the risk." Tiller v.
Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 318 U.S. 54, 63 (1943). This analysis is as perceptive as
any to be found in the FELA primary duty rule cases.
48. Another interesting question is whether the primary duty rule was conceived
as uniquely an FELA action or whether it was to be applied to all comparative negli-
gence systems. The difference is that if the primary duty rule is not an FELA doctrine
but is a doctrine applicable to all comparative negligence schemes, it should be found
wherever comparative negligence is found. It is not. But see Morris & Co. v. Thur-
mond, 262 F. 384, 385 (5th Cir. 1920).
If, on the other hand, the primary duty rule is an FELA doctrine, it should not
be transferred from Jones Act actions to unseaworthiness actions. In Stewart v. United
States, 25 F.2d 869 (E.D. La. 1928), the court was presented with a fact situation identi-
cal to that presented in United States Steel Prods. Co. v. Noble, 10 F.2d 89 (2d Cir.
1925), discussed in note 30 supra. The only difference was that the plaintiff in Noble
proceeded solely on a Jones Act count, while in Stewart, the plaintiff relied entirely on
the doctrine of unseaworthiness. In Noble, the plaintiff was barred by the primary duty
rule; the court in Stewart, however, rejected the primary duty rule as a complete defense,
applying instead the rule of proportionate fault.
Two recent cases, however, have borrowed the primary duty rule from Jones Act
cases and have applied it to the theoretically distinct count of unseaworthiness. See Pey-
mann v. Perini Corp., 507 F.2d 1318 (lst Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 914 (1975);
Reinhart v. United States, 457 F.2d 151 (9th Cir. 1972).
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1939: The FELA Amendments
The availability of assumption of risk as a complete defense to
most FELA actions, while contributory negligence was only a partial
defense, posed extravagant conceptual difficulties for the courts.4 9 Fi-
nally, in 1939, Congress amended the FELA, abolishing assumption of
risk as a defense."
The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Black, responded
with genuine exuberance in Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad.51
Justice Black noted that the application of assumption of risk to the
FELA had become "the subject of endless litigation," and that
[a]side from the difficulty of distinguishing between contributory
negligence and assumption of risk many other problems arose.
One of these was the application of the "primary duty rule" in
which contributory negligence through violation of a company rule
became assumption of risk.52
The Court, in dictum, lumped the primary duty rule together with such
bizarre-sounding doctrines as "promise to repair," "simple tool," and
"peremptory order," characterizing the whole panoply as a "maze of law
which Congress swept into discard with the adoption of the 1939
amendment to the Employers' Liability Act, releasing the employee
from the burden of assumption of risk by whatever name it was
called."5
Having thus interred the corpse of the primary duty rule, Justice
Black sealed the tomb with a solemn curse:
The theory that a servant is completely barred from recovery for
injury resulting from his master's negligence, which legislatures
have sought to eliminate in all its various forms of contributory neg-
ligence, the fellow servant rule, and assumption of risk, must not,
contrary to the will of Congress, be allowed recrudescence under
any other label in the common law lexicon.54
1952 to 1972: The Recrudescence of Primary Duty
Oh, keep the dog far hence that's friend to men
Or with his nails he'll dig it up again.55
If these events had spelled the end of the primary duty rule, the
above foray into the dead pages of FELA history would have been
49. See Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 318 U.S. 54, 61-68 (1943).
50. See Act of August 11, 1939, ch. 685, §§ 1, 4, 53 Stat. 1404 (codified at 45
U.S.C. §§ 51, 54 (1970)).
51. 318 U.S. 54 (1943).
52. Id. at 63.
53. Id. at 63-64.
54. Id. at 66-67; see Louisiana & Ark. Ry. v. Johnson, 214 F.2d 290 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 875 (1954).
55. T.S. ELIOT, THE WASm LANm, L The Burial of the Dead, lines 73-74.
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superfluous. In 1952, however, the primary duty rule flowered again in
Judge Learned Hand's opinion for the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit in Walker v. Lykes Brothers Steamship Co.56
In Walker, the owner of a vessel negligently placed a file cabinet
with defective catches in the captain's cabin. The result was that when
the vessel pitched about in angry seas, the drawers often fell out of the
cabinet, unceremoniously dumping the captain's papers on the floor.
The captain did not know of this problem until he had put to sea, but it
was sufficiently irksome that he ordered the port engineer of Lykes
Brothers in New Orleans to repair the latch. He also filed a written
requisition on the cabinet at Port Arthur. These efforts failed to
procure a repair, and Captain Walker dropped the matter. Out at sea
again, the captain was pacing about his cabin when, without warning,
the cabinet drawer rolled out and struck him in the shin.
The captain brought an action under the Jones Act and obtained a
jury verdict in his favor. Upon the defendant's appeal, however, the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit set aside the verdict and
ordered a new trial. In the course of its decision, the court exhumed the
primary duty rule from its decisive burial in Tiller and re-established it
as a complete defense to a Jones Act action.
Judge Hand noted that the trial court had instructed the jury that if
Captain Walker -had negligently failed to use sufficient effort to repair
the latches on the file cabinet, his recovery should be reduced according
to his fault.57 According to Judge Hand, this instruction was inade-
quate, as Captain Walker's fault was something more than contributory
negligence.
Judge Hand claimed that courts were accustomed to treating con-
tributory negligence as "a failure by the injured party to discharge a
duty owed towards the wrongdoer."58  Although he himself was skepti-
cal whether this characterization was proper, he believed that "it makes
no practical difference whether one adopts that form of words, or says
that the duty of the wrongdoer does not extend to, or is modified in its
scope in the case of, those who do not look out for themselves."' 9 He
therefore accepted the "conventional rubric" that contributory negli-
gence involved a breach of a duty to the wrongdoer. 0 Judge Hand
continued:
56. 193 F.2d 772 (2d Cir. 1952).
57. See id. at 773.
58. Id. But see W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF ToRTS 418 (4th ed. 1971). According
to Dean Prosser, "Contributory negligence involves no duty, unless we are to be so in-
genious as to say that the plaintiff is under an obligation to protect the defendant against
liability for the consequences of his own negligence."
59. 193 F.2d at 773.
60. Id.
[Vol. 27
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The important thing in situations like that at bar is to distinguish
between such a duty, which the law imposes upon the injured per-
son, regardless of any conscious assumption of a duty towards the
wrongdoer, and a duty which the injured person has consciously
assumed as a term of employment.61
The breach of a duty consciously assumed as a term of employment,
Judge Hand asserted, was a complete defense to any recovery. 2 For
this proposition, so close to assumption of risk, if indeed it is distin-
guishable from it at all, Judge Hand cited63 a familiar series of FELA
cases starting with Wiles.64  All of these cases predated Tiller,65 which
was not mentioned. 6   Moreover, Judge Hand does not discuss whether
the "conscious assumption of an employment duty" notion was actually
a recrudescence of assumption of risk, which had been specifically
barred from all FELA (and therefore Jones Act) cases.6 7
Having resurrected the primary duty rule, Judge Hand concluded,
"Hence, if the defendant had raised the point [on appeal], the judgment
could not stand. ' 68  Thus the trial court's failure to instruct on the pri-
mary duty rule was not the ratio decidendi in Walker. Rather,
Judge Hand remanded the case to the trial court on the ground that the
court had erroneously instructed the jury on the extent of a ship cap-
tain's duty of care. 69
61. Id. The court proceeded to explain that courts had inferred an intent of Con-
gress in the FELA to associate the phrase "contributory negligence" with "a momentary
inattention to one's own safety-the kind of thing of which we are all guilty every day
..... Id. at 774. On the other hand, Judge Hand asserted, "so serious a fault as the
breach of a duty assumed by the employee for the protection of others [and] incidentally
... for his own benefit" had never been intended by Congress to constitute contributory
negligence. See id. Judge Hand cited no authority for such a finding of congressional
intent; he attributed this view to "the courts." A survey of the primary duty rule cases
under the FELA shows a dearth of any discussion of whether Congress, by ending the
defense of contributory negligence, intended that FELA plaintiffs should be barred from
recovery by the primary duty rule. See, e.g., Boat Dagny v. Todd, 224 F.2d 208, 211
(lst Cir. 1955).
62. Judge Hand offered no hint as to the result in a case in which the plaintiff's
breach of a consciously assumed duty to protect himself and others is also a "momentary
inattention." His discussion in one case indicated that even this situation would bar re-
covery. Paster v. Pennsylvania R.R., 43 F.2d 908, 910 (2d Cir. 1930). But cf. Miller
v. Central R.R., 58 F.2d 635, 637 (2d Cir. 1932).
63. See 193 F.2d at 773 n.1.
64. 240 U.S. 444 (1916).
65. 318 U.S. 54 (1943).
66. For the case in which the court found this fact significant see Boat Dagny
v. Todd, 224 F.2d 208, 211 (1st Cir. 1955).
67. See Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 318 U.S. 54, 66-67 (1943).
68. See 193 F.2d at 774.
69. Judge Hand's criticism of the lower court's instructions was that they had
failed to impress upon the jurors the higher standard of care to which masters of vessels
The reappearance of the primary duty rule7" was first discussed in
1955 in Dixon v. United States,"' another Second Circuit decision, this
time written by Justice John Harlan sitting in circuit. Justice Harlan's
opinion in this case is well respected for its scholarly discussion of
unseaworthiness as a theory of recovery for seamen's personal injuries. 72
The opinion in Dixon also failed to venture beyond dictum on the
subject of the primary duty rule, since the court found that the plaintiff
had violated no duty to the employer. 73  Nevertheless, Justice Harlan's
discussion added a new and perplexing suggestion concerning the nature
of the rule and why it is distinguishable from assumption of risk and
contributed negligence:
[Walker, Wiles] and other cases of the same tenor which the ap-
pellant cites, are in no way inconsistent with the rule that assump-
tion of risk is not a defense . . . . Those cases are only instances
of the firmly established rule that an employee may not recover
were held. To charge the master with a duty of reasonable care, Judge Hand asserted,
had been inadequate. See id. at 775.
70. That Judge Hand would go well out of his way to resurrect the primary duty
rule, even when the defendant had not raised it on appeal, is odd in light of his past
criticism of the rule. See, e.g., Paster v. Pennsylvania R.R., 43 F.2d 908, 910 (2d Cir.
1930). In Miller v. Central Railway, he refused to apply the primary duty rule to viola-
tions of "rules generally enjoining caution, or responsibility." He explained that "[i]f
it did [apply to such situations], an employer could revive the defense of contributory
negligence by imposing as an affirmative duty such care as is appropriate to the situa-
tion . . . . [The FELA] was designed to end that defense and cannot be so con-
veniently avoided ....... Miller v. Central R.R., 58 F.2d 635, 637 (2d Cir. 1932).
71. 219 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1955).
72. See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 11, at 397-98.
73. The captain had ordered Dixon to see whether a ladder had been repaired and
was in safe condition. Dixon decided to test the ladder by climbing on it. Several rungs
popped out, plunging him backward. The district court held that the primary duty rule
was inapposite, commenting: "Here Dixon did not fail to fulfill a duty owed to his em-
ployer-on the contrary, he was in the process of carrying one out." 120 F. Supp. 747,
751 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 1954). Justice Harlan's view was that Dixon had never been told
not to descend the ladder. 219 F.2d at 12, 17.
In Peymann v. Perini Corp., a chief engineer with the duty to maintain the safety
of the engine room was held to have violated an employment duty when he had negli-
gently failed to wipe oil off a railing before standing on it. Dixon and Peymann can
be distinguished, as Peymann neglected to take any action whatever toward the execu-
tion of his so-called employment duty, while Dixon merely executed his duty in an unin-
telligent fashion. Had Dixon forgotten to test the ladder at all and then later suffered
injury from using it, his case would have been closer to Peymann's. Needless to say,
when such distinctions spell the difference between recovery and no recovery for the
plaintiff, they are fine indeed. Peymann v. Perini Corp., 507 F.2d 1318, 1321 (1st Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 914 (1975).
In Dixon, however, the primary duty rule was held inapplicable for another reason.
In that case, the court found that while the plaintiff was not as cautious as he might
have been, he was not sufficiently careless to overturn the lower court's finding that he
was not contributorily negligent. See 219 F.2d at 17.
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against his employer for injuries occasioned by his own neglect of
some independent duty arising out of the employer-employee rela-
tionship. Their result turns really not upon any question of "proxi-
mate cause," "assumption of risk," or "contributory negligence,"
but rather upon the employer's independent right to recover against
the employee for the non-performance of a duty resulting in dam-
age to the employer, which in effect offsets the employee's right
to recover against the employer for failure to provide a safe place
to work.74
Justice Harlan's explanation of the primary duty rule is difficult to
untangle. He suggested that the employer has an "independent right"
to recover for damages caused by the nonperformance of the plaintiff's
employment duty, and that this right entitles the employer to a return of
the very damages for which he was held liable to the employee. If the
recognition of this right means that the primary duty rule is actually a
compulsory counterclaim7 and not an affirmative defense,76 courts
would be required to order juries to proceed with the calculus of
comparative negligence, with consideration of the primary duty rule
following in some sort of "independent" and easily distinguishable
proceeding. No court, however, has followed this procedure. Instead,
juries have been instructed that if the plaintiff was negligent, and if that
negligence constituted a violation of an employment duty, the defendant
has a complete defense, not an independent cause of action.77
Also, it is unclear whether the employer's independent right of
recovery, as Justice Harlan characterized it, is based on the law of
agency or on the employee's assumption of a contractual duty. Neither
area of the law adequately explains Justice Harlan's view of the primary
duty rule.
Agency Theory
Under an agency gloss of Justice Harlan's theory, the plaintiff
would supposedly sue the defendant in negligence, with the defendant
setting up his partial defense of contributory negligence. Plaintiff
would be rewarded a reduced recovery. Defendant would then bring
his so-called "independent action" to recover an indemnity equal to the
"damage" which defendant suffered as a "result" of the plaintiff's
breach of his employment duty to use care and skill.78
The agency theory, for Justice Harlan's mysterious dictum, how-
ever, runs afoul of the rule that when the indemnitee's negligence
74. 219 F.2d at 16-17.
75. FaD. R. Cv. P. 13(a).
76. FED. R..Civ. P. 8(c).
77. See, e.g., Peymann v. Perini Corp., 507 F.2d 1318, 1321 (1974), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 914 (1975).
78. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 379 (1958).
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contributes to the harm, he can have no indemnity over from the
indemnitor. 9 According to Justice Harlan's formula, the defendant
would enjoy not only the benefit of a partial defense under comparative
negligence but also a right to recover the balance of the plaintiffs
recovery, a recovery which theoretically represents only that part of
plaintiff's loss caused by the fault of the defendant. The object of an
indemnity action is to ensure that the defendant is not ultimately liable
for fault imputed to him by mere operation of law. A comparative
negligence proceeding serves the same object as the defendant pays only
for that which his own fault caused. The addition of the independent
action distorts agency law to permit the defendant to escape completely
the consequences of his fault.
Contractual Theory
If, on the other hand, Justice Harlan meant that a seaman, by
accepting employment, impliedly warrants in contract that he will in-
demnify the employer for any negligence attributable to the employer
whenever the seaman's own negligence contributed to an injury, his
theory is in conflict with the ancient maritime tradition against exculpa-
tory clauses. 0 Under a contractual gloss of Justice Harlan's "independ-
ent action" approach, the employer should also be able to recover any
maintenance and cure that he is obliged to pay when the plaintiff
seaman negligently injures himself, as such negligence can be deemed a
violation of an employment duty. This result is contrary to the law of
maintenance and cure.81 The suggestion that all seamen contract away
the benefits afforded to them by comparative negligence is a radical
departure from admiralty's solicitous posture toward seamen, who have
traditionally been treated as childlike wards. Perhaps it is best to note
that Justice Harlan's discussion of the primary duty rule is dictum and
move on.
The next court to consider the primary duty rule was the Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit in another 1955 decision, Boat Dagny v.
Todd.82 In that case, a generator on a fishing vessel suddenly malfunc-
tioned, pitching the crew into darkness. The captain slipped, fell, and
was injured. He brought an action under the Jones Act and the
doctrine of unseaworthiness. Although the captain admitted he had
had the duty to make certain that the generator was in good operating
condition, Judge Magruder, speaking for the First Circuit, refused to
79. See id. § 102.
80. See Harden v. Gordon, 11 F. Cas. 480, 485-86 (No. 6047) (C.C.D. Me.
1823).
81. See Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724 (1943).
82. 224 F.2d 208 (1st Cir. 1955).
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overturn the captain's jury verdict on two grounds. First, the jury could
have found that the defendant's engineer had been solely negligent and
that therefore no blame adhered to the plaintiff.8 3 Second, Judge
Hand's resurrection of the primary duty rule in the Walker decision had
been contrary to the dictates of the FELA:
We cannot find in [the FELA] any suggestion that the Congress
had in mind this refinement between the two species of contribu-
tory fault. It is significant that Judge Hand felt himself to be
bound by cases which were decided before the 1939 amendment
to the Federal Employers' Liability Act, which plugged up what
Congress deemed to be a leak in the original Act, by abolishing
specifically the defense of assumption of risk.8 4
Judge Magruder then quoted at length85 from the portions of Tiller
which had apparently ended the primary duty rule in 1943.86
In 1956, the Fourth Circuit decided Mason v. Lynch Brothers
Co., 7 in which the court declined to choose between Walker88 and Boat
Dagny.8s  In Mason, an able-bodied seaman was asked to skipper a
tugboat for a short time. He negligently allowed oil to spill and then
slipped on it. The owner of the tug was found to have violated statutes
and regulations concerning safe working conditions and was held gener-
ally negligent in that regard. The court assumed that the primary duty
rule as described in Walker did not apply to ordinary seamen and
accordingly refused to invoke the rule.90 Perhaps it is fair to cite this
case for the proposition that in the Fourth Circuit, the primary duty rule
applies to violations of duty by captains,91 and possibly only captains of
ocean going vessels? 2
The Sixth Circuit considered the primary duty rule in the 1957
case of Chesapeake & Ohio Railway v. Newman.93  The court in
Newman viewed Walker as standing for the proposition that when a
seaman's breach of duty was the sole proximate cause of his injury, he
cannot recover, but when -his breach of an employment duty combined
83. Id. at 212.
84. Id. at 211.
85. See id.
86. Id. at 211, quoting Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 318 U.S. 54, 62-64
(1943).
87. 228 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1956).
88. 193 F.2d 772 (2d Cir. 1952).
89. 224 F.2d 208 (lst Cir. 1955).
90. See 228 F.2d at 712.
91. Cf. Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Newman, 243 F.2d 804, 808 (6th Cir. 1957).
92. See Dunbar v. Henry Du Bois' Sons Co., 275 F.2d 304, 306 n.1 (2d Cir.
1960); Spere v. The Argodon, 150 F. Supp. 1, 3 (E.D. Va. 1957).
93. 243 F.2d 804 (6th Cir. 1957).
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with the defendant's negligence, the plaintiffs damages should be re-
duced according to fault. 94
Unwelcome in the First, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits, the primary
duty rule also found itself rebuffed in 1960 in its home port, the Second
Circuit. In Dunbar v. Henry Du Bois' Sons Co.,9' the plaintiff's dece-
dent was the sole person aboard a steam derrick being towed about by a
tugboat. The derrick capsized and Dunbar was drowned. His widow
brought suit under the Jones Act and the jury awarded a verdict reduced
by the 20 percent fault attributed to Dunbar. On appeal, the defendant
alleged that Dunbar had violated his duty in not caulking the hull, that
this omission had caused the barge to sink, and that the primary duty
rule of Walker barred recovery.
All three judges agreed that Walker was inapplicable. One of
them, Judge Hincks, felt Walker could be distinguished on the facts.9 6
Ignoring the defendant's allegation that Dunbar had failed to caulk the
hull, Judge Hincks decided that the jury could have found that Dunbar
had been partially at fault for his inattention. Noting that Dunbar had
been on duty for seventeen hours, Judge Hincks concluded that if in fact
the jury had found Dunbar to have been inattentive, the primary duty
rule would not apply, because under the circumstances Dunbar could
not be said to have breached a duty in violation of a term of employ-
ment.
The other two judges preferred to address the issue directly rather
than to change the subject. Relying on Boat Dagny, they overruled
Walker altogether. Judge Clark asserted his belief that "in a proper
case a panel of this court may frankly state its disagreement with a
decision of another panel and refuse to be bound thereby. ' 97  Judge
Waterman simply dismissed the Walker doctrine as dictum.9 8
1972: The Ninth Circuit Checks In
Since putting to sea in 1952, the primary duty rule, as has been
94. See id. at 808. The court erroneously assumed that Dixon was "only an expo-
sition of the rule that an employee may not recover against his employer for injuries
occasioned by his own neglect of some independent duty arising out of the employer-
employee relationship." The court in Newman proceeded to "redefine" the Dixon hold-
ing in terms of proximate cause. 243 F.2d at 808. Compare cases cited in note 28
supra.
95. 275 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1960).
96. See id. at 306.
97. Id.
98. See id. The Second Circuit has been left in a state of confusion as a result
of this case. See, e.g., Nicroli v. Den Norske Afrika-Og Australielinie, 332 F.2d 651,
654 (2d Cir. 1964) (doubt expressed as to validity of primary duty rule); Ktistakis v.
United Cross Navigation Corp., 204 F. Supp. 293, 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (primary duty
concept rejected altogether).
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discussed,99 had received rough treatment. In 1972, however, the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit extended a red carpet welcome
to the doctrine.
Only one primary duty case had previously reached this court.100
The issue had been sidestepped by a finding that the plaintiff had not
been negligent and that he had had no duty concerning the defective
machinery which had injured him. Still, the court had looked askance
at the primary duty rule, suggesting that perhaps it was too close to
assumption of risk to withstand close scrutiny.' 0 '
In 1972, the Ninth Circuit in Reinhart v. United States0 2 reversed
its course, not only affirming the primary duty rule, but greatly expand-
ing the doctrine.
The Reinhart case, it will be remembered, concerned the chief
mate aboard a vessel transporting ammunition to Vietnam. 10 3 Wooden
sheathing was kept in the hold to separate the bombs from the metal
hull. While inspecting the hold for rats, Reinhart fell through the
wooden sheathing, which the Army had battered up during the unload-
ing of the cargo. The court ruled that since Reinhart had had the duty
to render the vessel safe and was at fault for having breached this duty,
he was barred from any recovery.
The Reinhart decision expanded the primary duty rule in many
directions. First, the plaintiff in that case had appealed on his unsea-
worthiness count only. 04 Thus, for the first time, the primary duty rule
was applied to the general maritime doctrine of unseaworthiness. Here-
tofore, the primary duty rule had never ventured beyond Jones Act
cases, in which FELA law applied.
This development is of importance to seamen. There will neces-
sarily be occasions when neither the vessel's owner nor its employees has
breached any duty to keep the vessel safe, but the vessel is nevertheless
unseaworthy. If the decision in Reinhart is to be followed, a seaman
may be barred from recovery by the primary duty rule even when he
brings suits under the doctrine of unseaworthiness.
The spillover from Jones Act cases to unseaworthiness cases is a
circumstance with which practitioners and text writers are unhappily
familiar. Jones Act negligence and unseaworthiness now overlap to a
very great extent. 05 This situation has led practitioners to plead both
99. See notes 82-98 & accompanying text supra.
100. See Hudson Waterways Corp. v. Schneider, 365 F.2d 1012 (9th Cir. 1966).
101. See id. at 1016 n.1.
102. 457 F.2d 151 (9th Cir. 1972).
103. See text accompanying notes 14-16 supra.
104. 457 F.2d at 151.
105. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has emphasized strongly "the complete di-
vorcement of unseaworthiness liability from concepts of negligence." Mitchell v. Traw-
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Jones Act cases and unseaworthiness causes of action in virtually all
personal injury suits.1" 6 Because appellate courts are invariably
presented with these double counts, they have come to mingle the two,
applying to unseaworthiness actions doctrines unique to Jones Act
actions.10 7  Reinhart may exemplify this tendency; nonetheless, at least
in the Ninth Circuit, the decision establishes the applicability of the
primary duty rule to the general maritime law. 10 8
The second noteworthy aspect of the decision in Reinhart is that it
marks the first time the primary duty rule has successfully barred
recovery in a federal court. The previous leading cases on the primary
duty rule in admiralty, Walker and Dixon, dealt with the subject by way
of dictum only. In the cases which followed, the rule was declared
either bad law'0 9 or inapplicable to the facts. 10 Thus, until 1972, the
ler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 550 (1960). An instance of one of the few remaining
areas in which the two doctrines do not overlap arose in a 1971 case in which the Court
ruled that unseaworthiness involved a condition existing aboard the vessel and that while
negligence might cause an unseaworthy condition, the "isolated personal act" of a crew
member could not be brought under the doctrine of unseaworthiness. Usner v. Lucken-
bach Overseas Corp., 400 U.S. 494, 499-500 (1971).
106. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 11, at 383.
107. Thus, courts may unconsciously have transferred the liberal causation rule of
the Jones Act cases to unseaworthiness actions. In Curry v. United States, the court
stated: "No case cited to the court has specifically adopted the [FELA] rule of causal-
ity where the defendant's liability has been predicated solely on unseaworthiness (rather
than negligence) but no good reason would call for a distinction here, and the lack of
authority may be attributable to the fact that an unseaworthiness claim is invariably tied
to a negligence claim." Curry v. United States, 327 F. Supp. 155, 164 (N.D. Cal.
1971).
But in Moragne v. States Marine Lines, the Supreme Court noted that "the benefi-
ciary provisions of the Jones Act are applicable only to a specific class of actions . . .
based on violations of the special standard of negligence that has been imposed under
the Federal Employers' Liability Act. That standard appears to be unlike any imposed
by general maritime law." Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 407
(1970) (dictum). Also in Moragne, the Supreme Court borrowed the wrongful death
provisions from the Jones Act and applied them to the general maritime law, but only
after a careful and well-reasoned discussion of the issues involved. Id.
108. Of course, a primary duty rule as a defense to a count under the Jones Act
but not to a count under the doctrine of unseaworthiness is deprived of all efficacy.
Since there is extensive overlap between the two causes of action, most plaintiffs can
win a verdict under either theory with equal ease. If a plaintiff is faced with a primary
duty rule defense to his Jones Act count, and can rely on his unseaworthiness count in
order to avoid the defense, the primary duty rule accomplishes nothing,
109. E.g., Dunbar v. Henry Du Bois' Sons Co., 275 F.2d 304, 306 (2d Cir. 1960);
Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Newman, 243 F.2d 804, 808 (6th Cir. 1957) (interpreting the
primary duty rule out of existence); Mason v. Lynch Bros. Co., 228 F.2d 709, 712 (4th
Cir. 1956) (limiting the doctrine to captains on ocean going vessels); Boat Dagny v.
Todd, 224 F.2d 208, 211 (1st Cir. 1955).
110. See, e.g., Hudson Waterways Corp. v. Schneider, 365 F.2d 1012, 1015-16 (9th
Cir. 1966); Nicroli v. Den Norski Afrika-Og Australielinie, 332 F.2d 651, 654 (2d Cir.
1964); Schlicter v. Port Arthur Towing Co., 288 F.2d 801, 805 (5th Cir. 1961).
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primary duty rule could have been dismissed as ill-considered dictum.
This alternative, of course, is no longer available.
A third important feature of Reinhart is the broad nature of the
facts. Reinhart's duty to his employer included "overseeing safe work-
ing conditions on the vessel." ' As mentioned above, Reinhart fell
through a hole in the hull's wooden sheathing. It was the duty of
longshoremen back in the United States to inspect and repair the
sheathing. In fact, the vessel did not even have the lumber to make
repairs at sea.'1 2 The court pointed out that Reinhart could have had
the sheathing made safe at Cam Ranh Bay or at least could have seen to
it that the hull was adequately illuminated.1 3  It was this fault-a
breach of Reinhart's "contractual" duty to his employer to render the
vessel safe-that barred any recovery by Reinhart." 4  Defense counsel
should be able to cite this case for the proposition that when a seaman
has a duty to render the entire vessel safe, and when he is injured
because of some unsafe part of the vessel which he should have rendered
safe, the seaman is barred from recovery and is deprived of the benefits
of the comparative negligence doctrine.
Judge Trask began his opinion in Reinhart with an intelligent
discussion of the facts and a thoughtful outline of the concept of
unseaworthiness.1 5 Thereafter, he appears to have misread the Walker
case" 6 and three district court opinions whioh he asserted had applied
the primary duty rule. 1 7 He noted that Ninth Circuit's only precedent
111. 457 F.2d at 152.
112. Id.
113. See id.
114. Id. at 154. The court's assertion that the presence of unsafe working condi-
tions is a breach of contract raises several questions: What would the result have been
if some other seaman had suffered the injury? Would Reinhart have been liable for
this same breach of contract, or did the terms of his contract cover only self-protec-
tion? If the latter, then contributory negligence has merely been relabeled an implied
contractual provision for the purpose of defeating comparative negligence.
115. See id. at 152.
116. See id. at 153. Judge Trask asserted that in Walker "[the defendant ship-
owner] argued that the Master of the ship had the duty to make the ship safe for the
voyage and could not recover damages for his own breach of that duty. Judge Learned
Hand agreed." Id. Actually, in Walker, the defendant had been negligent, and if
Walker had been allowed to recover it would have been on the basis of this negligence,
not on the basis of his own fault. Such a reading of the case would have made Walker
solely negligent and would have relieved the defendant of any independent fault.
117. See id. at 153. In the first of the three cases the court construed, a longshore-
man sued not his employer but a third party, the shipowner, whose defective equipment
had injured the longshoreman. The longshoreman was found not to have been negligent
in any way. Cook v. MV Wasaborg, 189 F. Supp. 464 (D. Ore. 1960). Since Cook
was not a Jones Act suit, it was governed by the general maritime law, to which FELA
doctrines have no application.
In the second case cited by Judge Trask as having applied the primary duty rule,
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on the primary duty rule, Hudson Waterways Corp. v. Schneider,1 "
observing correctly that in that case the rule had been held inapplica-
ble.' 19 Nevertheless, that opinion did contain a footnote critical of the
decision in Walker.12  Judge Trask dismissed the criticism with the
remark: "It is not necessary to respond here in detail to the remaining
comments of the note."'121 More striking are Judge Trask's answers to
the criticism in Boat Dagny"' of the Walker decision. The Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit in Boat Dagny had rejected Judge Hand's
primary duty rule thesis, citing the opinion in Tiller 23 at great length
and asserting that Judge Hand had overlooked the 1939 FELA amend-
ments.124 Judge Trask stated:
We cannot accept such an over-simplified explanation of Walker
v. Lykes. That case was decided in 1952, long after the Federal
Employers' Liability Act amendment and the decision in Tiller. It
seems naive to assume that neither Judge Hand nor his associates,
Chief Judge Swan and Judge Augustus Hand, were aware of either
the statute or the decision.' 25
1974: The First Circuit Overturns Boat Dagny
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, with its decision in
a captain ordered a maid not to wax the floors in the cabin. The captain slipped and
sued the owner of the vessel. The court found that the maid had not been negligent
and hence neither had the defendant owner. Any possible negligence, the court found,
was attributable to the captain for his failure to supervise the maid with more diligence.
Elliott v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 166 F. Supp. 731 (W.D. Pa. 1957), afjd, 259
F.2d 959 (3d Cir. 1958).
The third case cited by Judge Trask was the district court opinion in Mason v.
Lynch Bros. Co., 131 F. Supp. 255 (E.D. Va. 1955), rev'd, 228 F.2d 709 (4th Cir.
1956). See text accompanying notes 87-92 supra.
Judge Trask, after citing these cases, continued: "Still other cases have followed
a natural corollary of the Walker rule, holding that one may not recover on the basis
of unseaworthiness for an injury entirely caused by one's own negligence, although there
may not have been a contractual duty." 457 F.2d at 153 n.3. This proposition, how-
ever, is hardly a "natural corollary" to the primary duty rule any more than a general
denial to a complaint is the natural corollary to a plea of confession and avoidance.
118. 365 F.2d 1012 (9th Cir. 1966).
119. See 457 F.2d at 154-55.
120. Hudson Waterways Corp. v. Schneider, 365 F.2d 1012, 1016 n.1 (9th Cir.
1966).
121. 457 F.2d at 155. In doing so, Judge Trask cited a footnote in Du Bois' Sons
in which the court described as spurious various distinctions and refinements of the pri-
mary duty rule. The court in Du Bois' Sons included the footnote, however, to bolster
its argument that the primary duty rule was beyond salvage and should be overruled.
Dunbar v. Henry Du Bois' Sons Co., 275 F.2d 304, 306 n.1 (2d Cir. 1960).
122. 224 F.2d 208 (1st Cir. 1955).
123. 318 U.S. 54 (1943).
124. See id. See text accompanying notes 82-86 supra.
125. 457 F.2d at 154.
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Boat Dagny,128 had been the primary duty rule's most forthright oppo-
nent. In November 1974, that court reversed itself in Peymann v.
Perini Corp.'27
The facts in Peymann have been previously described at length.' 28
Peymann, an engineer, had the duty to repair a cylinder which dripped
oil. To perform this duty, he had to hook a chain fall to the deck above
the cylinder and attach the chain to the cylinder. To reach the deck
overhead, he climbed up on a railing over which seeped oil from the
cylinder. He slipped on the oil and fell.
Peymann brought his claim under the Jones Act and under the
doctrine of unseaworthiness. The trial court directed a verdict for the
defendant on the Jones Act count'2 9 and submitted the unseaworthiness
count to the jury with a very confusing instruction on the primary duty
rule. 130  The jury rendered a verdict for the defendant. On appeal, the
verdict was affirmed in an opinion written by Judge Aldrich.
The crux of the exceedingly abstruse decision seems to be that
Peymann had had the duty to render the engine room seaworthy, and
that since his failure to remedy an unseaworthy condition had been
involved in the accident, he was barred from recovery.1'3 This failure,
126. See notes 82-86 & accompanying text supra.
127. 507 F.2d 1318 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 914 (1975).
128. See text accompanying notes 14-16 supra.
129. The court of appeals justified the directed verdict by explaining that the Jones
Act issue was totally subsumed under the unseaworthiness count. See 507 F.2d at 1323.
There is a danger that plaintiffs may be prejudiced by such a ruling, since the Jones
Act guarantees a jury trial, allows for a liberal instruction on causation, and provides
other advantages unavailable under the general maritime law.
130. See id. at 1321. The instruction read as follows: "If you find that the duty
of maintaining this engine room in a seaworthy condition was solely a duty which the
plaintiff owed to his employer to perform, and if you find that the condition of unsea-
worthiness which was the cause of the plaintiff's accident was due solely to the failure
of the plaintiff to carry out his duty to his employer to keep the engine room in a sea-
worthy condition, then you must find for the defendant in this case.
"In short, the plaintiff cannot recover on the basis of an unseaworthy condition
which is due wholly and solely to a failure on his part to perform the responsibilities
that were assigned to him. That is one of the aspects of the case that- it is the burden
of the defendant to establish [that it was solely the plaintiff's duty to keep this
engine room in a seaworthy condition]." Id.
In essence, the trial court said that if the unseaworthy condition had been due solely
to the plaintiff's omission, the plaintiff was barred from recovery. An omission, how-
ever, can hardly cause an injury without some pre-existing offending condition. The in-
struction tends to obscure the question of whether the defendant was independently liable
for the unseaworthiness of the vessel or whether the plaintiff had been the sole cause
of his injuries.
131. The court in Peynann distinguished at length between asssumption of risk and
the rationale for its finding that Peymann was barred from recovery. Peymann had al-
leged that the defendant was at fault for not supplying a ladder or extra crew to help
him. The court of appeals concluded that the jury had discounted this testimony and
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it should be noted, did not relate to the presence of the oil. Rather,
Peymann's duty went to rendering the railing safe by wiping off the oil.
In the ordinary slip-and-fall case, omission of this duty would constitute
found that "the accident was due solely to the failure of plaintiff, as the one in charge,
to have the engineroom seaworthy by obtaining an available ladder or, if it was proper
to use the rail, to see that it was free of oil before he stepped on it." Id.
Two inferences may be drawn from this conclusion. First, since the plaintiff's
omission of his duty to make the engineroom seaworthy put him at fault, an unseaworthy
condition must have arisen independently of the plaintiff's fault. This determination
alone should have been enough to bring the comparative negligence system into play but
for the primary duty rule.
Second, a ladder had been available but Peymann had chosen to stand on the oily
railing. The railing had been oily because of the unseaworthiness of the vessel and, as
the court discussed later, Peymann had had the primary duty to remedy this condition.
Therefore, he was barred from recovery. The ladder was irrelevant to this result. Nev-
ertheless, the court indulged in a long digression explaining why Peymann would have
been barred from recovery solely for his failure to get the ladder. The rationale of the
court was that the "plaintiff, as the person having full freedom of decision [between
the ladder and the rail], was the sole cause of his accident." Id. at 1322.
Thus, even though the defendant was at fault for violating its warranty of sea-
worthiness, the plaintiff was barred for his conscious and voluntary decision to use the
rail and not the ladder. The court emphasized, however, that the result did not depend
on assumption of risk. Had assumption of risk been the basis, of course, the defendant
would not have had a complete defense, since the concept had long since been read out
of the maritime law. See Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S. 424 (1939). Nev-
ertheless, Peymann was completely barred from recovery. The court explained this deci-
sion by asserting that the abolition of assumption of risk "does not mean that a seaman
may not be wholly barred if he selects a method he could not reasonably think open
to him." 507 F.2d at 1322.
Judge Aldrich supplied a few illustrations of this subtle distinction. For example,
he suggested that "if the cook were given a proper bottle opener but chose to knook the
head off the bottle, he could not complain." Id. Indeed he could not, without a show-
ing that the defendant had also been negligent and that the defendant's negligence had
caused the injury. As a further example, he suggested that "if there were two gangways
and one was marked 'Do not use,' it could not be thought that a seaman insisting upon
using it despite the proferred alternative could complain of the ship's unseaworthiness."
Id. Indeed he would be barred from recovery, if assumption of risk were a defense;
however, it is not. A seaman's comparative fault may be very high in such a situation,
but as long as the defendant's unseaworthiness could be said to be a contributing factor,
it would seem that with assumption of risk no longer available, the defendant would have
less than a complete defense.
The First Circuit's failure to distinguish assumption of risk from the hypothesis that
plaintiff was barred from recovery for his choice of the oily railing over a ladder was
betrayed by the following statement: "So in the case at bar, if there was a ladder avail-
able which was the single means the engineer was supposed to use, as, indeed, his own
testimony suggested, it would not be proper to hold the vessel responsible to any degree
if his decision not to use it was a free choice. The court made its charge particularly
clear by conditioning nonliability upon a finding that plaintiff, as the person having full
freedom of decision, was the sole cause of his accident. This is not a case where a
lower echelon employee was offered defective means, so that both he and the ship may
have been at fault." Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Judge Aldrich thus
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no more than contributory negligence, a breach of the standard to which
the plaintiff should have conformed for his own safety."3 2 The addition
of the plaintiff's duty to render safe an unseaworthy engine room, made
this omission also a breach of an employment duty. The presence of
this duty promoted the shipowner's defense from a partial to a complete
defense. In contrast, if Peymann had been an ordinary seaman with no
particular duty to wipe up the oil in the absence of a direct order to do
so, he would have been contributorily negligent only, and the defendant
would have had only a partial defense.133
This analysis of the holding in Peymann must be considered in
light of the court's statement about the case:
Instead of passing a rag over the rail, [Peymann] proceeded, indif-
ferently, to step on it, and then, unless the court's [jury] instruc-
tion on [the primary duty rule] was correct, would seek to hold the
ship [liable] even though the jury were to find the fault solely his.' 34
Here the court invoked the language of sole proximate cause reminiscent
of the old FELA cases discussed earlier. 3 5 It is unclear, however,
viewed the difference between assumption of risk and Peymann's conduct as a difference
in the quality of the choice between two methods of completing the job. If "a vessel
makes two means of performing an act, one of which is unsafe," it would be inappropri-
ate "to foreclose recovery completely if the seaman chose the less desirable alternative."
Id. If, however, the less desirable alternative was "not reasonably open," a plaintiff who
chose it would be barred. The proposition that assumption of risk turns on whether the
choice made involves a slight or somewhat larger lapse of judgment by plaintiff is dubi-
ous. In fact, the Supreme Court has been rather explicit on the subject: "Any rule of
assumption of risk in admiralty, whatever its scope, must be applied in conjunction with
the established admiralty doctrine of comparative negligence and in harmony with it.
Under that doctrine contributory negligence, however gross, is not a bar to recovery but
only mitigates damages." Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S. 424, 431 (1939).
132. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 463 (1965).
133. This statement seems fair in light of what the court had to say about Caddy
v. Texaco: "There a seaman was instructed to clean up oil and do some other work,
but was not told in what order to proceed. The court held that his doing the other work
first could only make him contributorily negligent. . . . Without deciding, we may sug-
gest that if in Caddy the seaman had been instructed to clean up the oil first, but had
gone ahead, instead, with his other work, he could not recover for slipping in the oil
because by hypothesis he had been offered a safe place to work but had taken the unsafe
place, against orders. If he followed orders he would have had a safe place to work."
507 F.2d at 1323 n.2, construing Caddy v. Texaco, Inc., 292 N.E.2d 348 (Mass. 1973).
Such an interpretation is not borne out by the Caddy case, which denounced the
primary duty rule as assumption of risk in disguise and refused to apply it. See Caddy
v. Texaco, Inc., 292 N.E.2d 348 (Mass. 1973).
134. 507 F.2d at 1322.
135. Judge Aldrich, in one of his illustrations, said: "If a seaman had spilled oil
and then, rejecting an opportunity to wipe it up, had walked in it, it would shock the
conscience to allow him to recover. . . . We see little difference in the present case."
Id. The difference is that Peymann was guilty of an omission of a duty, which of neces-
sity implies the prior fault of another party.
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whether the court meant that the defendant's fault had been rendered a
remote cause or that the defendant had never been at fault. Since the
court, however, never considered Paymann's fault except in terms of
omission, it must of necessity implied prior unseaworthiness, and Judge
Aldrich's comparison of the case to Walker compels the conclusion that
Peymann was barred by an affirmative defense rather than by a failure
to show liability attributable to the defendant.
If this conclusion is accurate, the language of proximate cause is
inadequate to explain the result. The only difference between the
application of comparative negligence and the application of the pri-
mary duty rule was the presence of Peymann's employment duty; how-
ever, the presence of the employment duty to wipe away the oil, which
bars recovery, in place of the self-protection duty to wipe it away, which
does not bar recovery, should not change the "cause" of the accident,
which was the failure to wipe. The court thus used causation to label
the result, not to explain it.
Judge Aldrich proceeded from this perplexing analysis of the slip-
and-fall to a consideration of the discussion in Boat Dagny136 concern-
ing the primary duty rule. He correctly described Boat Dagny as a case
"where the plaintiff breached his duty to supervise someone else but the
ship was independently at fault."'1- 7  This situation was not a case,
wrote Judge Aldrich, in which the primary duty rule would apply.
Despite this hopeful beginning, however, the court mistakenly analyzed
the Walker case:
We regard this as quite different from Walker, where the master
failed to supervise himself and the fault was his alone. While we
criticized some of the court's language, Boat Dagny does not con-
tradict a strict reading of Walker that a seaman may not recover
where his breach of duty constitutes the sole cause of injury.138
Walker, however, was certainly not a case in which supervisorial negli-
gence played no part. Captains of oceangoing vessels simply do not get
down on their hands and knees with monkey wrenches to repair defec-
tive file cabinets. A captain would most likely delegate this humble
chore to some less august member of the ship's crew. Furthermore, as
has been amply demonstrated,' 39 Walker was not a case in which the
136. See text accompanying notes 82-86 supra.
137. 507 F.2d at 1323.
138. Id. at 1323. In contrast, the court in Mason limited the primary duty rule
to captains of ocean going vessels, persons whose rank of necessity implies almost ex-
clusively supervisorial negligence. The Fourth Circuit reached this result by purporting
to read the Walker decision narrowly, while the First Circuit, also purporting to read
Walker narrowly, reached precisely the opposite conclusion. Compare Mason v. Lynch
Bros., 228 F.2d 709, 712 (4th Cir. 1956) with Peymann v. Perini Corp., 507 F.2d 1318,
1322-33 (lst Cir. 1974), cert. denied 421 U.S. 914 (1975).
139. See notes 93-94, 116 & accompanying text supra.
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plaintiff's negligence was the sole cause of his injury. The defendant in
Walker was also negligent but was given the complete defense of the
primary duty rule.
There are several observations to be made relative to the decision in
Peymann. First, a possible explanation may be that the court was very
reluctant to overturn a jury verdict for a defendant, an increasingly rare
phenomenon in maritime personal injury law. Second, it is possible
that the court misunderstood that the ship was unseaworthy and that the
defendant was pleading an affirmative defense, and that the court
therefore mistakenly viewed Peymann as solely at fault. If the court did
err in this respect, it likewise mistook the primary duty rule and the
Walker case as holding no more than that when the plaintiff is the sole
cause of his injuries, he cannot recover. Third, the court concurred
with the court in Reinhart in holding that the primary duty rule is a
defense not limited to Jones Act counts but applicable to unseaworthi-
ness counts as well. Fourth, the First Circuit apparently excluded from
the primary duty rule the negligent failure to supervise, but it did so only
in dictum. Finally, the court seems to have held that when the plaintiff
has the general employment duty to render an unseaworthy vessel sea-
worthy and is injured by an unseaworthy condition, the primary duty
rule applies, unless the plaintiff's violation of his duty involves a failure
to supervise others.
Tallying up the Circuits
The circuit court of appeals are in a state of disarray over the
primary duty rule. No circuit has consistently rejected it, no circuit is
free of cases criticizing it, and no two circuits agree as to exactly what
the primary duty rule is.
A review of the aspects of the primary duty rule on which the
courts agree will help to place this discussion in perspective. First of
all, it should be clear that the primary duty rule is an affirmative defense
and therefore is appropriate only when the defendant is somehow lia-
ble.'40 The defense itself consists of two elements: the plaintiff must
have been negligent, and the negligence must have constituted the
breach of a duty that the plaintiff consciously assumed as a term of
employment. 141 The plaintiff may have breached the duty to supervise
others (as in the case of ship captains), 42 the duty to render safe an
140. There are, however, signs of judicial confusion on this point. See Peymann
v. Perini Corp., 507 F.2d 1318, 1322-23 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 914
(1975); Reinhart v. United States, 457 F.2d 151, 153 (9th Cir. 1972).
141. see Walker v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 193 F.2d 772, 774 (2d Cir. 1952). The
assertion that negligence is a necessary element is an inductive conclusion. No admir-
alty decision has ever invoked the primary duty rule in the absence of negligence.
142. See id.; Elliott v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 166 F. Supp. 731 (W.D. Pa.
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unseaworthy vessel, 143 or the duty to follow orders. 4 ' If the plaintiff
has failed to obey orders, the failure must involve a conscious deviation
from the black letter of the order. 145  Performing an order in a negli-
gent or unwise fashion does not invoke the primary duty rule.1 46  It is
universally agreed by courts recognizing the primary duty rule that it is a
defense to a Jones Act action.' 47  No case has specifically denied that
the primary duty rule is applicable to the plaintiffs twin count of
unseaworthiness, and two cases have held that it is. 148  Beyond these
generalizations the circuits diverge.
Of all the circuit courts of appeals to have considered the question
of the primary duty rule, 4 9 the First 5 ' and Ninth' Circuits are the
strongest supporters. The First Circuit would remove supervisorial
negligence from the reach of the primary duty rule.'52 The Fourth
Circuit, curiously, came to the opposite view, holding the primary duty
rule applicable only to captains of seagoing vessels, whose negligence of
necessity is primarily of a supervisorial nature.153 Both circuits pur-
ported to read Walker narrowly to arrive at these opposing conclusions.
The Second Circuit, which is responsible for the existence of the primary
duty notion in admiralty,154 is now the circuit least likely to apply the
primary duty rule.' 55 The Third Circuit has not addressed the issue,
1957), aff'd, 259 F.2d 959 (3d Cir. 1958). See also Mason v. Lynch Bros., 228 F.2d
709 (4th Cir. 1956).
143. See Peymann v. Perini Corp., 507 F.2d 1318 (Ist Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 914 (1975); Reinhart v. United States, 457 F.2d 151 (9th Cir. 1972).
144. See Peymann v. Perini Corp., 507 F.2d 1318, 1322 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. de-
nied, 421 U.S. 914 (1975).
145. See id.
146. See id.; Dixon v. United States, 219 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1955). See note 73
supra.
147. See, e.g., Walker v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 193 F.2d 772, 773 (2d Cir. 1952).
The Jones Act incorporates by reference the FELA, and the primary duty rule was taken
from FELA cases. See text accompanying notes 18-48 supra.
148. See Peymann v. Perini Corp., 507 F.2d 1318 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 914 (1975); Reinhart v. United States, 457 F.2d 151 (9th Cir. 1972).
149. No primary duty cases have been decided by the Eighth, Tenth and District
of Columbia Circuits, largely because venue in these circuits, if possible, is extremely
unlikely. In addition, the primary duty rule remains a question of first impression in
the Fifth and Seventh Circuits. Critical discussion, however, did appear in Sehlicter v.
Port Arthur Towing Co., 288 F.2d 801, 805 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 828
(1961).
150. Peymann v. Perini Corp., 507 F.2d 1318 (Ist Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 914 (1975), overruling Boat Dagny v. Todd, 244 F.2d 208 (1st Cir. 1955).
151. Reinhart v. United States, 457 F.2d 151 (9th Cir. 1972), disapproving Hudson
Waterways Corp. v. Schneider, 365 F.2d 1012, 1016 (9th Cir. 1966).
152. See 507 F.2d at 1322.
153. Mason v. Lynch Bros. Co., 228 F.2d 709, 712 (4th Cir. 1956).
154. Walker v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 193 F.2d 772 (2d Cir. 1952).
155. See note 98 supra.
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although it approved a lower court opinion which strongly argued in
dictum in favor of the primary duty rule. 156 In the Sixth Circuit, the
primary duty rule was held to .have been overruled by Dixon, 5 7 and
therefore to be no longer good law, but this holding was based on a
misreading of the Dixon case.'58  In a more recent case, 59 the court
held that the primary duty rule was inapplicable to the case before it but
did not deny that the primary duty rule was the law in the Sixth
Circuit.160
A Critique
If the decisions in Reinhart and Peymann can be taken as indicat-
ing a trend, the primary duty rule seems to be winning acceptance in
maritime personal injury law. Nevertheless, it seems fair to say that if
only Judge Learned Hand in Walker'6' had considered the analysis in
Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad6 2 of the viability of the primary
duty rule as applied to FELA cases, the rule would not exist today in the
law of admiralty, just as it no longer exists under the FELA.16 3
From a theoretical standpoint, the defense of the primary duty rule
is justifiable only to the extent that it is distinguishable from contributo-
ry negligence and assumption of risk, both of which are proscribed as
complete defenses to Jones Act' and unseaworthiness 6 5 actions. In
view of the fact that the application of the primary duty rule requires the
plaintiff to have been negligent, 66 however, the rule is distinguishable
from contributory negligence only by the requirement of a breach of an
employment duty which the plaintiff consciously assumed. This breach
of a contractual duty is invariably contributory negligence as well. To
paraphrase Justice Hugo Black, 67 the primary duty rule is merely a
different label from the common law lexicon describing the very same
156. See Elliott v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 166 F. Supp. 731 (W.D. Pa.
1957), affd, 259 F.2d 959 (3d Cir. 1958). But see Yates v. Dann, 167 F. Supp. 174,
179 (D. Del. 1958).
157. Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Newman, 243 F.2d 804, 808 (6th Cir. 1957).
158. See note 94 supra. See also Dunbar v. Henry Du Bois' Sons Co., 275 F.2d
304, 306 n.1 (2d Cir. 1960).
159. Noack v. American S.S. Co., 491 F.2d 937 (6th Cir. 1974).
160. See id. at 941.
161. Walker v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 193 F.2d 772 (2d Cir. 1952).
162. 318 U.S. 54 (1943).
163. See Louisiana & Ark. Ry. v. Johnson, 214 F.2d 290, 292 (5th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 348 U.S. 875 (1954).
164. The Jones Act incorporates the FELA, including 45 U.S.C. § 53 (1970). See
46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970).
165. See Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S. 424, 428-29 (1939).
166. See note 141 supra.
167. See text accompanying note 54 supra.
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concept which Congress intended to eliminate as a bar to a Jones Act
suit. The intent of Congress should not be defeated by mere label
switching.
The doctrine poses a serious threat to the entire comparative
negligence scheme, of whioh admiralty courts have heretofore been so
protective. Breaches of employment duties can be found almost every-
where, and no doubt maritime employers, burdened with the yoke of
nearly unavoidable liability for personal injuries to their employees,
would be willing to fill volume after volume with new safety regulations
the violation of which would invoke the primary duty rule.
Fortunately for seamen, the courts have not yet been willing to
stretch this potentially elastic defense very far. Indeed, some courts
have been willing to entertain some highly dubious distinctions to avoid
the harsh consequences of the primary duty rule. 68 No doubt it is
significant that the major primary duty cases have involved relatively
minor injuries with little emotional appeal. 16 9
Perhaps the real source of the primary duty rule can be found in
the growing indignation many jurists have for the extremely liberal pro-
plaintiff doctrines in admiralty. 170  With the maritime versions of causa-
tion,"' res ipsa loquitur, 17 comparative negligence, and unseaworthi-
ness, as well as the onerous burden of care to which defendant shipown-
ers are held, 173 no plaintiff who has a genuine injury is likely to fail to
168. See Mormino v. Leon Hess, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 314 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). In Mor-
mino, the plaintiff was ordered to fix a valve that was leaking oil. He procrastinated
and later slipped on the oil that had collected. The court found that while the plaintiff
had had the duty to fix the valve, the duty to wipe up the oil had belonged to another
crew member. Id. at 317. In a Second Circuit case, the plaintiff slipped on some wet
sugar that had spilled from the cargo. The defendant argued that the primary duty rule
-barred recovery, since the plaintiff had had the duty to sweep up the cargo. The court
ruled that the plaintiff's sweeping had been intended to salvage the sugar. To render
the vessel totally free of slippery sugar required hosing down the deck, which had been
the job of some other crew member. Therefore, the court reasoned, the primary duty
rule was inapplicable. Nicroli v. Den Norske Afrika-Og Australielinie, 332 F.2d 651,
654 (2d Cir. 1964).
169. Compare Walker v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 193 F.2d 772 (2d Cir. 1952)
(bruised shin; primary duty rule upheld) with Dunbar v. Henry Du Bois' Sons Co., 275
F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1960) (injury resulted in death; primary duty rejected).
170. See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 11, at 273-74.
171. The plaintiff need show only that the defendant's negligence played "some
part, however slight," in the plaintiffs injury to satisfy the causation requirements of
the FELA and Jones Act. Rogers v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 352 U.S. 500, 506 (1957): Fer-
guson v. Moore McCormack Lines, Inc., 352 U.S. 521, 523 (1957) (companion cases).
172. To get to the jury under maritime res ipsa loquitur, the plaintiff need show
only that it was possible that the injury was caused by the defendant's negligence. John-
son v. United States, 333 U.S. 46, 49 (1948); GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 11, at 378.
173. See Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, 287 U.S. 367, 374-75 (1932).
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recover damages. Added to this seaman's arsenal is the tradition of
maintenance and cure, which provides a seaman with guaranteed room
and board and medical expenses, 174 independent of whatever jury ver-
dict he may recover for his injuries. Primary duty is one of the last
bona fide complete affirmative defenses to which shipowners can cling.
Indeed, the emotional reaction against the notion that a plaintiff can
recover even though he has not done his job is powerful, but it tends to
obscure the facts that in a primary duty case, the defendant, too, is at
fault, if only vicariously, and that the plaintiff in such a case is almost
always injured because he is doing his job.
The primary duty rule does violence to logic in its modification of
the comparative negligence scheme. It suffers from a complete absence
of theoretical justification, abrogating the clear language of the FELA
that contributory negligence is not to bar a plaintiff's recovery. Admi-
ralty courts, therefore, should hesitate to permit the primary duty rule
defense, in light of its questionable origins and its identity with the
proscribed defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk.
David Gray Carlson*
174. See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 11, at 282. The authors conclude, "The
'poor and friendless' seaman is thus the beneficiary of a system of accident and health
insurance at shipowner's expense more comprehensive than anything yet achieved by
shorebound workers." Id.
* Member, Second Year Class.
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